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IN DEFENSE OF SIMONIAN SCIENCE
David Diekema and Patrick McDonald

In his recent book Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga articulates
a number of arguments about the conceptual relationship between science
and faith, especially Christian faith. He uses Herbert Simon’s evolutionary
account of altruism and David Sloan Wilson’s evolutionary account of religion as exemplars of theories that are in genuine but superficial conflict with
Christian faith. This paper argues that any conflict between Christian faith and
evolutionary psychology or Simonian science is even more superficial than
Plantinga himself admits. We argue that apparent conflicts between Christian
control beliefs and social scientific theorizing are due predominantly to (1)
misunderstanding the scope of a theory (or the terms used in a theory) or (2)
metatheoretical overreaching on the part of one side or the other. Specifically,
the apparent conflict between Simon’s account and Christian faith is rooted in
a misunderstanding of Simon’s limited definitions of rationality and altruism.
The apparent conflict between Wilson’s account and Christian faith is a result
of failing to distinguish Wilson’s broader metatheoretical commitments from
the more limited scope of his scientific theory of religion.

There have been numerous calls for Christian scholars to relate their faith
beliefs directly to their scholarship.1 Alvin Plantinga, among others, suggests that the behavioral sciences are one area where Christian control
beliefs2 are likely to have a significant impact.3 This is presumably because
much of what goes on in the human sciences is not neutral with regard
to religious beliefs and often proceeds on the basis of metaphysical or

1
See for example Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion; Marsden, The Outrageous Idea of Christian Scholarship; Plantinga, The Twin Pillars of Christian Scholarship; and Van
Leeuwen, The Sorcerer’s Apprentice.
2
Christian control beliefs are those central tenets of the Christian faith that operate as basic
background beliefs, and that are taken to control the direction of one’s metatheorizing and
theorizing in one’s respective discipline (Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, 67).
3
Plantinga, Twin Pillars of Christian Scholarship, 60; “Methodological Naturalism, Part
1,” 12. See also Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism, Part 2”; Evans, “Christian Perspectives on the Sciences of Man”; Evans, Preserving the Person; Evans, Wisdom and Humanness in
Psychology; Van Leeuwen, The Person in Psychology; Gaede, Where Gods May Dwell; Perkins,
Looking Both Ways; Jeeves, Psychology and Christianity; Myers, The Human Puzzle; and Lyon,
Christians and Sociology.
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metatheoretical4 assumptions that are quite opposed to religious beliefs.5
In his most recent book, Where the Conflict Really Lies, Plantinga argues
that there are some cases of genuine conflict between religion and science.
While ultimately these are considered to be superficial conflicts, in that
they do not provide defeaters for Christian or theistic belief, they are nontrivial in the sense that a Christian will want to reject those theories that
are in real, direct conflict with theses (knowledge) that Christians accept
on the basis of their broader knowledge structure.
Two examples of theories in conflict with Christian control beliefs,
suggests Plantinga, are Herbert Simon’s evolutionarily-driven rational
choice theory of altruism and David Sloan Wilson’s evolutionary account
of religion.6 Plantinga uses Simon’s work, in particular, as an exemplar or
placeholder for theories that are in at least superficial, if not deep, conflict
with Christian control beliefs.
[S]ome scientific theories or claims—theories or claims taken from evolutionary psychology and historical Biblical criticism—do indeed conflict with
Christian (and Muslim and Jewish) belief. Evolutionary psychologists have
come up with a number of theories that are wholly incompatible with Christian beliefs: theories purporting to explain altruism in terms of unusual docility and limited rationality, morality as an illusion fobbed off on us by our
genes, and religion itself as involving belief that is false. . . . [E]volutionary
psychology contains many widely accepted theories and claims that (at least
as they stand) are in conflict with Christian belief. And let’s call scientific
theories incompatible with Christian belief Simonian science, in honor of
Herbert Simon and his theory of altruism.7

It might be instructive to take a close look at both the Simon case and
the Wilson case to examine the extent to which there is even a superficial
conflict between these theories and Christian control beliefs.
This paper will argue that any conflict between Christian faith and evolutionary psychology or Simonian science is even more superficial than
Plantinga himself argues. Specifically, we will argue that the apparent conflict Plantinga sees between Simon’s account of altruism and Christian faith
is rooted in a misunderstanding of the way Simon is defining rationality
and altruism. When this misunderstanding is resolved, the appearance of
conflict dissolves. We will then argue that the apparent conflict Plantinga
sees between Wilson’s account of religion and Christian faith is rooted at the
metatheoretical level, and once unnecessary metatheoretical assumptions
4
There are several definitions of metatheory in the social sciences. For the purposes of
this paper, metatheory will be used to designate any assertions, background assumptions,
metaphysical claims, etc. that are non-essential to the particular scientific theory in question.
For the most part these are claims or assumptions that are not taken as testable and provide
a more general interpretive framework for placing a particular theoretical explanation.
5
Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism, Part 1,” 2.
6
Simon, “A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism”; Wilson, Darwin’s
Cathedral.
7
Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 163–164.
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are eliminated from Wilson’s scientific theory proper, no conflict exists. We
argue more generally that apparent conflicts between Christian control
beliefs and social scientific theorizing are due predominantly to these two
general issues: (1) misunderstanding the limited scope of scientific theories
and the terms used in such theories or (2) failing to properly disentangle
those statements essential to a scientific theory proper and those statements
that make up the general metatheoretical framework of the scientist/theorist
in question. We argue that if science is done properly, and is properly evaluated, the two cases of science-religion conflict identified by Plantinga are
not cases of conflict at all. In fact, Simon’s theory and Wilson’s theory may
actually exemplify a deep concord between religion and science. Assuming
Plantinga picked two potentially strong cases of real conflict between religion and science to make his case, this raises the question as to whether the
set of scientific theories actually in conflict with Christian belief is, in fact,
an empty set.
The Simon Case
The question Simon addresses is: can neo-Darwinian science adequately
account for the presence (and presumably, the persistence) of altruism on
a substantial scale in human societies? Important here is that Simon defines altruism in purely genetic terms:
By altruism I mean behavior that increases, on average, the reproductive
fitness of others at the expense of the fitness of the altruist. Fitness simply
means expected number of progeny. . . .
Notice that “altruism” and “selfishness” in genetics bear no close resemblance to these terms in everyday language.8

So how do we account for the behavior of people like Mother Teresa who
devote their lives to the welfare of others, when the rational way to act is to
increase one’s personal fitness, i.e., egoistically, thus increasing the likeli
hood that one’s genes will be disseminated into the next generation?9 Of
course, the underlying mechanisms involved in this egoistic tendency are
unlikely to be fully conscious. Rather they are likely to function as drives
(e.g., the “sex drive”) or as behavioral tendencies rooted in temperament,
emotion, preferences, etc. But, in any case, for a rational choice theorist
or evolutionary behavioral scientist, altruism becomes a “problem” to be
explained. That is, it is behavior that would seem to run counter to the
natural tendency of self-preservation and propagation of one’s genes.
Simon’s explanation of the Mother Teresas of the world involves the
concepts of “docility” and “bounded rationality.” Docility is the tendency
of some individuals to conform to society’s expectations of them without
Simon, “A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism,” 1665.
The terms “rational” and “egoistic” are used in highly circumscribed ways as well. “Rational” would be defined in terms of a particular outcome and/or preference structure—in
this case, amassing progeny. “Egoistic” as well would be defined in terms of behavior that is
narrowly focused on protecting one’s genetic lineage.
8
9
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fully thinking through the implications for personal fitness. Bounded
rationality is actually a more general concept that would incorporate docility. Bounded rationality refers simply to the general fact that people
often do behave in “irrational” ways, in that they do not behave optimally
because of imperfect or incomplete information, imperfect information
processing, normative constraints, cognitive shortcuts, etc. The empirical and theoretical investigation of bounded rationality has blossomed
in recent years and is coming to play a much larger role in economics,
psychology, and sociology when discussing human decision-making and
action. Bounded rationality does not imply a negligent irrationality on the
part of the actor. Rather, it simply recognizes the inherent limitations on
rational thought rooted both in the individual organism (cognitive limitations) and the environment (lack of quality information, time pressures,
etc.). In any case, the Mother Teresas of the world, as a result of docility
and generally bounded rationality, behave less than optimally in regard to
gene propagation. Hence, on Simon’s theory, Mother Teresa behaved in a
sub-optimal and, hence, less than perfectly rational way.
Plantinga argues that such an explanation is anathema to the Christian
perspective. Simon’s theory of altruism is a prime example of how science
is anything but religiously neutral. Here is Plantinga’s argument in his
own words:
No Christian could accept this account as even a beginning of a viable explanation of the altruistic behavior of the Mother Teresas of the world. From a
Christian perspective this doesn’t even miss the mark; it isn’t close enough to
be a miss. Behaving as Mother Teresa does is not a display of bounded rationality—as if, if she thought through the matter with greater clarity and penetration, she would cease this kind of behavior and instead turn her attention to her expected number of progeny. Her behavior displays a Christ-like
spirit; she is reflecting in her limited human way the magnificent splendor
of Christ’s sacrificial action in the atonement. (No doubt she is also laying
up treasure in heaven.) Indeed, is there anything a human being can do that
is more rational than what she does? From a Christian perspective, the idea
that her behavior is irrational (and so irrational that it needs to be explained
in terms of such mechanisms as unusual docility and limited rationality!) is
hard to take seriously. From that perspective, behavior of the sort engaged in
by Mother Teresa is anything but a manifestation of “limited rationality.”10

Plantinga suggests that to propose that people like Mother Teresa have
the trait of docility and bounded rationality, as Simon does, implies that
they are somehow defective, unintelligent, and lack acuity—“this limited
rationality is a matter of running a quart low, of playing with less than a
full deck, of being such that the elevator doesn’t go all the way to the top
floor.”11 He also suggests that when Simon assumes that the rational course
of action is to strive to promote fitness, he is using the term “rational” to
10
11

Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism, Part 1,” 3.
Ibid.
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mean “properly functioning,” such that a properly functioning human
being (i.e., one who is not insane, under undue stress, or defective in some
other way) will have as one of his or her goals or motivations to promote
or maximize fitness. As such, this use of “rational” as involving proper
functioning is a normative use of the term.
Rationality, however, is a deeply normative notion; the rational course is the
right course, the one to be recommended, the one you ought to pursue.
Simon, therefore, seems to be making a normative claim, or perhaps a normative assumption; it is a vital and intrinsic part of what he means to put
forward.12

On Plantinga’s reading, Simon’s account assumes that a properly functioning human being ought to behave in a way that promotes fitness. This
assumption flies directly in the face of Christian control beliefs and, as
such, Simon’s account is inconsistent with Christian belief.13 To be fair,
in Where the Conflict Really Lies, Plantinga is somewhat less harsh with
Simon, but re-asserts his substantive claims.
But is Simon’s theory really in conflict with Christian beliefs? A fair interpretation of Simon may actually suggest a deep concordance between
Simon’s account and Christian belief.14 As stated earlier, Simon has a very
narrow, genetic definition of altruism, one based on expected progeny.
When Plantinga states, “Why, asks Simon, do people like Mother Teresa
do the things they do? Why do they devote their time and energy and
indeed their entire lives to the welfare of other people?,”15 he seems to
be misinterpreting the question Simon is actually asking. Simon’s question would be more the following: Given that devoting one’s life to the
welfare of others is likely to be costly in terms of reproductive success (i.e.,
in moving one’s genes into the next generation), and given that altruism
likely has some genetic basis, as would selfishness or egoism, how is it that
altruism continues to show up in human societies, i.e., why is altruism not
selected out by evolutionary pressure?16 In Simon’s own words:
In any event, our goal is not to establish how much or how little altruism,
in either sense, there is in human behavior, but rather to show that altruism
on a substantial scale is not inconsistent with the strictest neo-Darwinian
assumptions.17

Ibid.
Ibid., 5.
14
This paper makes no claim about the scientific validity of Simon’s theory. The question
being addressed is simply whether or not it is in conflict with Christian beliefs.
15
Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism, Part 1,” 2.
16
See Rushton et al., “Altruism and Aggression.” What is inherited is, of course, open to
question. Altruism is not a specific behavior pattern likely to be controlled by a single gene
or even a gene that is directly linked to a particular behavioral tendency. What is inherited
is likely to be something more diffuse, such as the tendency to empathize with others, or
docility, or norm internalization.
17
Simon, “A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism,” 1665.
12
13
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On a neo-Darwinian account, if altruism involved significant costs in
terms of fitness, i.e., reproductive success, then it would be eliminated.
The issue is not so much an account of the underlying motivation for the
individual (e.g., is a particular altruistic behavior or lifestyle motivated by
devotion to God, by selfishness, or by lack of mental acuity), but rather
why a behavior pattern continues to exist in a society (or population) that
would appear, on the face of it, to make one less genetically fit.
It is important to keep in mind here that genetic altruism has at most
partial overlap with what we ordinarily think altruism to be, or for that
matter, selfishness. What may appear to be very selfish behavior in terms
of everyday definitions of selfishness would count as altruism on Simon’s
definition. On Simon’s account, working day and night for the good of one’s
company, and at the same time for the good of one’s paycheck in terms of
increased wages, would be construed as altruistic to the extent that it decreased the time and energy available for reproduction for oneself relative
to others. At the same time, giving large donations to various charities may
actually be very selfish behavior to the extent it makes one more attractive
and provides opportunities to meet new potential sexual partners.
A proper evaluation of Simon’s theory requires us to see his theory
for what it is: an attempt to demonstrate that altruism, as defined narrowly in terms of its impact on genetic fitness, is not inconsistent with a
neo-Darwinian account of human evolution. Is this attempt somehow inconsistent with a Christian worldview? Let’s take a closer look at Simon’s
account as we answer this question.
As it turns out, Simon’s model of altruism actually assumes that altruists, by and large, are fitter than selfish individuals. Why are they fitter?
Not because of their altruistic behavior, but because of their docility.18 Docility as defined by Simon is the disposition to be taught. That is, a docile
individual is one who is highly teachable or especially adept at social
learning. Hence, a docile individual is better able to learn social norms and
expectations among other things, such as job or academic skills. Docility
in combination with bounded rationality implies that individuals will
be more likely to rely on social teachings than on their own independent
evaluation of the facts or by independently figuring things out. Docility,
then, will often contribute to fitness: a docile individual will not have to
touch a hot stove to learn that such behavior is unwise, will not have to
try dangerous drugs to determine that they have negative cognitive and
behavioral consequences, and will be more likely to study hard in school
because her parents tell her it is the way to a successful life. Docility combined with bounded rationality, then, is a good thing (at least within certain
limits). It makes one more fit. Hence, on Simon’s model, docile individuals
18
On Simon’s account, docility is what is being selected for at the individual level, not
altruism. This is very important to keep in mind. The argument is not that altruism increases
fitness, but that docility does. Altruism can be seen as piggybacking on other internalized
norms that do increase the fitness of the individual. This argument can be seen in Gintis,
“The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Altruism.”
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will be more likely to have progeny and, hence, move their genes into the
next generation.
On Simon’s account, altruism becomes a tax that is able to be imposed
on docile individuals because of their tendency to learn what society
wants them to learn combined with bounded rationality, the difficulty
or impossibility of evaluating beliefs for all their potential contributions
to fitness. Societies that impose this tax, i.e., that instill altruism in their
docile members, should be more successful than societies that do not impose such a tax and, hence, should be at an evolutionary advantage.
A society that instilled such behaviors [altruistic] in its docile members
would grow more rapidly than one that did not; hence such behaviors
would become, by evolution at the social level, a part of the repertory of
proper behaviors of successful societies. Societies that did not develop such
a repertory would be less fit than those that did, and would ultimately disappear.19

This assumes, of course, that the altruism being taught has a greater corresponding advantage for other individuals in the society than the costs
to fitness of the altruistic individual. But the question remains whether
altruism could ultimately survive within these more successful societies
if it is costly to the individual reproductive success of the altruist. Simon’s
answer is that as long as the costs imposed on docile individuals by the
altruistic demands of society are lower than the advantages accrued by the
skills and knowledge acquired through docility, the proportion of altruists
in a society should increase.20
[T]he fitness of altruists will actually exceed the fitness of selfish individuals
as long as d [the gross increase in offspring due to docility] exceeds c [the net
cost in offspring of altruistic behavior acquired through docility], that is, as
long as the demands for altruism that society imposes on docile individuals
are not excessive compared with the advantageous knowledge and skills
acquired through docility.21

Successful societies will adjust the altruistic demands placed on docile
members so as to keep the altruistic costs to fitness far enough below the
reproductive benefits of docility in order to ensure that docility will be
maintained at functional levels within the society.
Now Simon does assume, as Plantinga points out, that if individuals
could discriminate between “proper” or “socially accepted” behavior that
is personally beneficial vs. altruistic, they may be inclined to opt for the
Simon, “A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism,” 1667.
Of course, extreme forms of altruism, from a genetic standpoint, will not be fitnessenhancing. Mother Teresa would be an exemplar of this extreme form of altruism. But
presumably societies with at least some Mother Teresas would be better off than societies
with none. This would be true to the extent that Mother Teresa’s failure to reproduce is compensated at the group level by the increase in reproduction afforded by her contributions
to others. And to the extent that altruism is at least indirectly a genetic trait, the number of
Mother Teresas in any society should be quite small.
21
Simon, “A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism,” 1667.
19
20
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personally beneficial behavior. But the amount of time and energy required
to make such distinctions would offset the benefits of docility. Hence, again
docility is not seen to be a defect, a negative trait or an indication of lack
of intelligence.22 It is rather a personally and socially beneficial trait. What
this basically boils down to is this: docile individuals will be more likely
to accept social norms and socially prescribed admonitions to help others
over purely self-interested, egoistic behaviors. And as it turns out, docility,
even given the corresponding “costs” to fitness involved in the altruistic
behaviors that often result from docility, actually increases (on balance)
the fitness of both the individual and the society. So in terms of normative
claims, it can hardly be said that being perfectly rational, if that is defined
as being fully egoistic, is a good thing or the right course to take, or the path
one ought to pursue. At least, this is not the case with Simon’s model.23
A significant sticking point between Plantinga and Simon seemingly revolves around the use of the concept “rationality.” Plantinga reads Simon
as making normative claims when he talks about actors making rational
decisions. But Simon is using “rationality” purely descriptively. More specifically, Simon uses “rationality” in the way economists and behavioral
scientists typically employ that term in the context of their theories explaining human choices. In this tradition, “rational” behavior is that which
maximizes the likelihood of a given goal or outcome at minimal cost. What
is considered rational in any given situation is dependent on the actor’s
preference structure which ordinally ranks the goals or outcomes being
pursued and the cost structure perceived to be operative in that situation.
Preference structures can change, can differ across individuals, and can be
conscious or non-conscious.
On Simon’s theory, high on any organism’s preference structure (including humans) will be reproduction (expected number of progeny) as
this is what is required for an organism to be genetically successful. Those
organisms unsuccessful at reproduction were not among our ancestors.
Of course, reproduction will not necessarily be consciously high on an
individual’s preference structure, but many behaviors that ultimately may
lead to reproduction are likely to be so—such as the desire to acquire and
display objects of high social value (e.g., expensive cars, high-end electronics, etc.).
As stated, it is easy to see how a preference structure that values closeness to God could conflict with a preference structure that values expected
number of progeny. What is considered a rational course of action on one
preference structure is, in some cases, likely to conflict with what would
be a rational course on the other. Simon’s theory simply recognizes that a
In fact, on Simon’s theory, docility should be correlated with intelligence.
This is similar to Robert Frank’s argument that to behave in a purely self-interested way
is often irrational in the long run. This serves as the basis for Frank’s argument regarding
the importance of emotions in understanding human behavior and their significance for
solving various dilemmas confronted by pure rational choice theories. See Frank, Passion
within Reason.
22
23
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preference structure that consistently leads to behavior that increases the
reproductive fitness of others at excessive expense to oneself (i.e., where the
net cost in offspring of altruistic behavior is greater than the gross increase
in offspring due to docility) is unlikely to be a successful evolutionary
strategy. As a result, the genes underlying such a preference structure
and its corresponding behavioral patterns are unlikely to be passed on to
future generations. As a result, such preference structures and their corresponding behavioral patterns should ultimately be eliminated or become
quite rare in human groups.
As quoted earlier, Plantinga sees Simon’s explanation of altruism as
directly opposed to a Christian worldview. But as presented above, Simon’s model does not seem to be obviously inconsistent with a Christian
worldview, and it actually has much to say for itself from a Christian
perspective. In fact, from a Christian perspective wouldn’t we expect the
world God created to act like Simon’s? That is, wouldn’t we expect docility,
and the corresponding altruism, to be rewarded? On a Christian account,
we would expect to see the extreme sort of sacrificial altruism found in
people like Mother Teresa, that which is actually detrimental to fitness
and progeny, to be relatively rare, and as a result of its social benefits to be
highly regarded by others in society. And isn’t that what we see? Further, a
Christian might well expect egoism to compete with and be complexly intertwined with altruism in a fallen world, i.e., in a world of image-bearers
who are estranged from God.
Plantinga recognizes that altruism can be highly rational given certain
value commitments. For the Christian, a life of altruism can have the
highest of pay-offs—eternal life. And as it turns out, rational choice theory
has been applied quite successfully to several problems in the sociology of
religion. Rodney Stark has used rational choice theory to offer an explanation of Christian sacrifice at perhaps its most extreme—martyrdom.24 Stark
argues that martyrdom promised rewards not only in the world to come,
but very often prior to the actual event. Now clearly these rewards were
not enough to attract the vast majority of followers, just as the life-commitment of a Mother Teresa is very rare. But they are enough for a select few,
and no doubt biology, temperament, personality, and upbringing work
together in complex ways to make one open to such avenues of sacrifice.
The Bible also seems to provide us with exemplars that are perfectly
consistent with such a rational choice account of behavior, choice, and
sacrifice. This is contrary to John Leightner’s recent critique of the rational
choice model.
Clearly, there are people who profess to be Christians and who try to live a
Christian lifestyle, but who do it to maximize their utility by escaping hell
or gaining heaven. However, such a motivation is contrary to the teachings
of the Bible.25
24
25

Stark, The Rise of Christianity.
Leightner, “Utility Versus Self-Sacrificing Love,” 320.
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But is it really contrary to Biblical teaching? Look at Jesus’ words in Matthew
6:1–4:26
Be careful to not do your acts of righteousness before men, to be seen by
them. If you do, you will have no reward from your Father in heaven. So
when you give to the needy, do not announce it with trumpets, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and on the streets, to be honored by men. I tell
you the truth, they have received their reward in full. But when you give to
the needy, do not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing, so
that your giving may be in secret. Then your Father, who sees what is done
in secret, will reward you.

Similarly in Luke 6:30, 31, 35:
Give to everyone who asks you, and if anyone takes what belongs to you, do
not demand it back. Do to others as you would have them do to you. . . . But
love your enemies, do good to them, and lend to them without expecting to
get anything back. Then your reward will be great, and you will be sons of
the Most High, because he is kind to the ungrateful and wicked.

We are not suggesting that Jesus is providing a normative theory of human
behavior here—that people should help others because to do so will result
in rewards. That is, Jesus is not suggesting people should do good only
because it serves long-range egoistic strategies. But we do think Jesus fully
recognizes here the fallen condition of humankind, one result of which
is that we do tend to act egoistically, and that it is difficult to get people
to consistently help others unless there is some pay-off. In the terms of
behavioral economics, Jesus here is exhorting us to quit time-discounting
and start weighing future rewards and costs more heavily than immediate
rewards and costs. This is not much different than parents exhorting their
children to save their money for future desires and needs (e.g., education)
rather than spend it on some immediate pleasure that will be gone very
quickly. And all parents know full well how difficult it is to get children
to think this way.
The main point here is that Simon’s account does not appear to be in
conflict with Christian beliefs in either a superficial or a deep sense. Instead of being seen as a potential defeater of Christian beliefs, it may in
fact be in deep concord with a Christian worldview. Given that Simon’s
approach is used as a placeholder by Plantinga for scientific theorizing
that is in direct conflict with Christian beliefs, one may wonder whether
the assumed conflict between evolutionary thinking in the behavioral sciences and Christian belief is more apparent than real.
We suggest that any apparent conflict between Christian belief and
evolutionary thinking in the social sciences is largely a result of: (1) misunderstanding the scope and terminology of the theory (what is actually
being claimed by the theory); or (2) the Christian or the evolutionary
theorist importing unnecessary claims into the framework of scientific
26

All Biblical references are from the NIV.
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investigation, i.e., untestable metatheoretical claims that are irrelevant to
the theoretical explanation of the particular issue at hand. The Simonian
case would be an example of the former. The second case discussed by
Plantinga in Where the Conflict Really Lies, Wilson’s evolutionary theory of
religion, would be an example of the latter.27
The Wilson Case
In Darwin’s Cathedral, David Sloan Wilson offers an account of the origin
and persistence of religious belief and practice from an evolutionary perspective. Like Simon’s approach to altruism, this can be seen as a case of
puzzle solving. If religion were at best a useless spandrel and at worst
dysfunctional or maladaptive, then how would one explain its nearuniversality and persistence across time and culture?28 This question
arises in particular given that on the surface the costs of religion appear so
steep in terms of time, money, identity, and self-sacrifice.29
Wilson’s answer here depends on a version of group selection theory
wherein group-level adaptations can increase the fitness of both groups
and individuals within those groups.30 In particular, Wilson’s focus is on
the potential functional utility of religion at the level of the group. Given
this focus, the truth-value of any claims being made is secondary to the
adaptive properties of the religion in question, i.e., religion may or may
not be truth-aimed in any particular case.
[A] fictional belief system can be more motivating than a realistic belief system. . . . [A] fictional belief system can perform the same functions as externally imposed rewards and punishments, often at a much lower cost.31
It is true that many religious beliefs are false as literal descriptions of the real
world, but this merely forces us to recognize two forms of realism; a factual
realism based on literal correspondence and a practical realism based on
behavioral adaptedness.32
However, it appears that factual knowledge is not always sufficient by itself
to motivate behavior. At times a symbolic belief system that departs from
factual reality fares better.33

A society with a factually incorrect set of religious beliefs can be as adaptive, if not more so, as a society with factually correct religious beliefs if
those beliefs serve the group-level functions specified by Wilson.
Plantinga’s focus, and our own, is on Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral.
A spandrel is a characteristic that arises as a byproduct of the evolution of another trait.
Gould, “The Exaptive Excellence of Spandrels as a Term and Prototype.”
29
Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral, 171.
30
The particular mechanisms underlying Wilson’s theory are irrelevant to the conflict perceived by Plantinga. Since our concern is with Plantinga’s criticism of Wilson our focus will
be there as opposed to the adequacy of Wilson’s account as a scientific theory.
31
Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral, 99.
32
Ibid., 228.
33
Ibid., 229.
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Plantinga’s primary criticism of Wilson’s account of religion is that, like
Freud’s earlier account, it assumes or states that the processes underlying
religious belief are not truth-aimed or reality-oriented. Freud sees religious
beliefs as primarily aimed at wish-fulfillment, while Wilson sees religious
beliefs as primarily aimed at fitness-enhancement. Wilson argues that religious beliefs are adaptive in that they operate to increase the rate of survival
of those groups (and those who make up such groups) that hold these beliefs relative to those that do not. Taken as stated, Plantinga takes Wilson’s
theory to be in direct conflict with Christian belief, since the Christian will
believe that those processes underlying belief formation are in fact designed
with the end being true belief, not necessarily fitness enhancement.
If Plantinga’s account of Wilson’s theory is correct, then he is also correct that there is indeed a conflict here. To the extent that an account of
the origin of religion, evolutionary or otherwise, assumes or explicitly
states that such beliefs are counterfactual, false, or imaginary, then such
an account is clearly incompatible with Christian belief. But, if Wilson is
claiming what Plantinga suggests, then the problem is not with Wilson’s
science as such but rather with metatheoretical overreaching on Wilson’s
account. That is, he sneaks an unnecessary metatheoretical claim into his
scientific theory (i.e., a claim that does no explanatory theoretical work).
An easy fix is to simply claim that the processes underlying religious
beliefs are not necessarily truth-aimed. And, in fact, there is good reason
to believe that is indeed what Wilson intends.34 On such a claim it is an
open question as to whether or not the processes underlying religious
belief lead to true beliefs. After all, Wilson’s theory is not concerned with
the truth-content of the beliefs in question, but rather with the social and
adaptive functions they serve for the larger whole. A scientific explanation operating within the constraints of methodological naturalism should
be agnostic regarding the truth-value of claims about the supernatural.35
Ibid., 228.
Methodological naturalism, on Plantinga’s account, is “the idea that in science we
should proceed as if the supernatural is not given” (Where the Conflict Really Lies, 170). More
specifically, methodological naturalism asserts that a proper data set, theory, and evidence
base for scientific inquiry will not invoke appeals to supernatural agents, forces, or revelation
(Where the Conflict Really Lies, 172–173). Methodological naturalism remains agnostic about
the existence of supernatural agents, forces, or revelation as well as the truth-value of statements making reference to supernatural beings or forces. It simply restricts appeals to these
elements in the doing of science.
Wilson is an advocate of methodological naturalism as evidenced by his statements in
various public fora, e.g., “On the Importance of Being a Methodological Naturalist,” and
“The Future of Religion According to the John Templeton Foundation,” In Darwin’s Cathedral, Wilson characterizes science in the following way:
Science works best when a subject can be resolved into well-framed hypotheses
that make different predictions about measurable aspects of the world (1).
And later when discussing design in nature, he states:
Thus if we are studying organisms and if we exclude special creation and alien designers from other planets from consideration, we are left with design as a source
of evidence of evolutionary adaptation (71).
34
35
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And his theory works perfectly well while remaining agnostic about the
truth-content of the beliefs in question. All his theory needs to claim is that
religious belief systems, and their corresponding practices, have practical
utility that enhance the fitness of groups that possess them. That adaptive
function is independent of the truth-value of the beliefs in question. And
within the scope of a scientific explanation of the origin of religious beliefs,
it is irrelevant whether such beliefs are true or false, rational or irrational.
Let us be clear. It is evident from Wilson’s text and especially his approach to the Scriptures (even more so, the Gospel narratives) that he does
not share Christian beliefs. At one point, relying heavily on the work of
Elaine Pagels, he describes the Gospels as follows:
According to Pagels, all four Gospels function as how-to manuals enabling
local congregations to function as adaptive units. The instructions are encoded in the historical narratives, which makes all four Gospels suspect as
literal history. Narratives designed to motivate behavior are free to omit, distort, and make up facts whenever necessary. The Four Gospels differ from
each other, not because they were separated in time, but because they were
designed to serve the needs of different Christian churches scattered across
the Roman Empire. They are a fossil record of cultural adaptation at an extremely fine scale. Just as upstream and downstream guppy populations
evolved to be different in response to the presence and absence of predators, the instructions provided by the four Gospels evolved to be different
in response to differences in the social environments inhabited by the early
Christian Congregations.36

No doubt such an analysis of the Gospels appears to be inconsistent with
some Christian faith traditions and would fairly be taken as an attack on
the very foundations of these traditions. However, it is especially with
regard to these claims that one must carefully distinguish what Wilson
himself seems to believe about the claims of religion, whether Christian
or other, and what strictly speaking his theoretical account warrants, if
successful in its terms.
Like the Simon case, however, it is an open question as to whether
Wilson is really even making the claims that Plantinga assigns him: that
is, that “religion is essentially a means of social control employing or involving fictitious belief”37 and that “religious belief isn’t reality oriented.”38
In fact, there is good reason to believe that Wilson remains agnostic on the
truth-value of religious belief across the board. Wilson makes an important
distinction between factual and practical realism. Factual realism in the
case of religious beliefs refers to the degree to which the particular beliefs
correspond to literal descriptions of the world. Practical realism refers to
Taken together these statements are consistent with Wilson’s commitment to methodological
naturalism as a means to understanding religion scientifically.
36
Pagels, The Origin of Satan, 207–208.
37
Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 138.
38
Ibid., 151.
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the behavioral adaptiveness of various beliefs—that is, the degree to which
a set of beliefs motivates behaviors that are adaptive in the real world.
On an evolutionary account of religious belief, practical realism becomes
the “gold standard” by which rationality is judged. The factual reality
of particular beliefs may indeed become irrelevant. But no judgment is
necessary regarding the factual reality of religious beliefs on Wilson’s account, although even the Christian would have to acknowledge that not
all practically realistic (i.e., functional) religious belief systems correspond
to factual reality.
In fact, Wilson’s theory is one that would be very compatible with
Christian belief if we accept it within its limited scope.39 Wouldn’t we expect a world that God created to be structured such that religious belief
would in fact pay off in very pragmatic ways, exactly the ways that Wilson
suggests: satisfying the basic, fundamental physical and psychological
needs of individuals within society? So, like the Simon case, rather than
there being conflict between Wilson’s theory and Christian belief, there
may in fact be deep concord. Wilson’s theory ultimately may work better
within a Christian worldview than a naturalistic worldview, given that the
function of religion according to Wilson would not be surprising from a
Christian perspective.
Also important to note here is Wilson’s suggestion that science as a
unifying system (science here defined as a system devoted exclusively to
the pursuit of factual realism) may fail at the level of practical realism in
that were we to accept it within all spheres of human activity, society may
actually be less adaptive.
[M]uch religious belief does not represent a form of mental weakness but
rather the healthy functioning of the biologically and culturally well-adapted human mind. . . . [F]actual realists detached from practical reality were
not among our ancestors. It is the person who elevates factual truth above
practical truth who must be accused of mental weakness from an evolutionary perspective.40
It follows that the values of scientific society do not suffice for the society as
a whole. They must be supplemented with other values that place a greater
emphasis on practical realism and that hopefully apply to all members of
the society as moral equals.41

Again, there is deep concord here between Wilson’s theory and Christian
belief. If we take Wilson at face value here, a case could be made that
science as a system may operate best within a wider Christian/theistic/
religious worldview. Factual realism may serve adaptive functions within
a larger system of values and practices that are more geared toward practical realism.
39
Plantinga himself acknowledges as much in his discussion of the possibility of a
“(Wilson)-minus” (Where the Conflict Really Lies, 142–143).
40
Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral, 228.
41
Ibid., 231.
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Plantinga’s focus on Wilson’s evolutionary account of religion is part
of a more general critique of evolutionary accounts of religion. But the
reason he spends more time with Wilson is that the apparent conflict between Wilson and Christian belief runs deeper than the other accounts
addressed by Plantinga. Prior to his focus on Wilson, Plantinga discusses
the work of the following thinkers: Rodney Stark, Michael Ruse and E.
O. Wilson, Pascal Boyer, Scott Atran, and Stewart Guthrie. In all of these
cases, however, Plantinga comes to a conclusion that is similar to the conclusion we ultimately reach in the Wilson case. That is, that the theories
these authors propose include unnecessary meta-theoretical add-ons that,
when eliminated, erase any apparent conflict between the proposed theory
and Christian belief. For example, both Stark and Boyer suggest religion
is a spandrel of rational thought that for Stark leads people to attempt to
negotiate “nonexistent goods” (e.g., eternal life) from “nonexistent super
natural agents.”42 For Boyer, as reported by Plantinga, religion springs
from “a family of cognitive phenomena involving ‘counterintuitive’
beings (beings who act in ways counter to our ordinary categories)”43 such
as invisible beings who can act in the world. According to Atran, “religion
is (1) a community’s costly and hard-to-fake commitment (2) to a counterfactual and counterintuitive world of supernatural agents (3) who master
people’s existential anxieties such as death and deception.”44 But in these
three cases Plantinga recognizes that apart from the “gratuitous” counterfactuals, there is nothing in Boyer, Atran, or Stark that is inconsistent
with Christian belief.45 A similar move is made in regard to E. O. Wilson
and Michael Ruse’s claim that “ethics is an illusion fobbed off on us by our
own genes to get us to cooperate,”46 and that “humans function better if
they are deceived by their genes into thinking there is a disinterested objective morality binding upon them, which they should obey.”47 Again in
this case Plantinga recognizes that simply removing the theoretically unnecessary claims that “ethics is an illusion” and that “belief in an objective
morality is a deception” leaves the theory essentially intact and removes
any apparent conflict between the theory and Christian belief.
The case of Stewart Guthrie hinges on the validity of the process by
which we come to form beliefs about agency. Guthrie sees religious beliefs
42
This characterization of Stark (found on 137–138 and 142 of Where the Conflict Really Lies)
comes directly from Wilson’s summary of Stark found in Darwin’s Cathedral, 48. It is important to note here that in the work cited by Wilson (Stark, “Micro Foundations of Religion”),
Stark never characterizes the supernatural agents referenced in religious belief systems as
“non-existent” or “imaginary.”
43
Boyer, Religion Explained.
44
Atran, In Gods We Trust, 4, quoted in Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 139.
45
Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 140.
46
Ruse and Wilson, “The Evolution of Ethics,” 310, quoted in Plantinga, Where the Conflict
Really Lies, 134.
47
Ruse and Wilson, “Moral Philosophy as Applied Science,” 179, quoted in Plantinga,
Where the Conflict Really Lies, 134.
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as the result of a hypersensitive agency detection device (aka HADD).48
Because of its hypersensitivity it will deliver many false positives,
meaning we are prone to mistakenly attribute agency to objects or entities
in our environments that are not in fact agents. The assumption is that
false positives are less costly than false negatives, e.g., failing to attribute
agency to an object that could potentially do us great harm, such as a very
hungry tiger. But as Plantinga points out, this theory does not discredit
belief in supernatural agents or render such beliefs irrational just because
they were induced by HADD. Since HADD delivers true beliefs as well as
false, there is no reason to believe that any particular belief (including the
belief in a supernatural agent) is false simply because it was produced by
HADD. This distinguishes Guthrie from Wilson, in that Plantinga reads
Wilson as claiming that the belief producing mechanisms involved in religious beliefs are not aimed at the production of true belief.
Wilson then appears to be in deeper conflict with Christian belief than
any of the other cases Plantinga addresses. But what we have shown is
that in the first place it is not clearly the case that Wilson makes the strong
claim Plantinga attributes to him. For example, Wilson does claim that
“many religious beliefs are false as literal descriptions of the real world,”49
but he also recognizes that many non-religious belief systems also “distort
the facts of the real world.”50 But even if we attribute the strong claim to
Wilson, any apparent conflict with Christian belief is erased with a slight
adjustment to the alleged claim, i.e., that the belief-producing mechanisms involved in religious belief are not necessarily truth-aimed. Such an
adjustment leaves the theory’s explanatory power intact and removes an
unnecessary metatheoretical claim, i.e., a claim that lies beyond the reach
of science operating within the constraints of methodological naturalism.
Simonian Science and the Christian: Moving Forward
While we have argued that Simon’s theory of altruism and Wilson’s evolutionary account of religion are not in conflict, superficially or otherwise,
with Christian belief, what does Plantinga suggest we do if there were real
(yet superficial) conflict between science and genuine tenets of Christian
faith? Does he suggest that the Christian should ignore good science and
hold the faith beliefs to be untouchable? Should she hold that claims in
science that do conflict with Christian faith must simply be denied as false
if in conflict with known truths of faith? Sensibly, Plantinga does not recommend either option. One option would be to set up a parallel scientific
enterprise where the commitments of Christian faith play a role as part
of the so-called evidence base. This has been defended by Plantinga in
a prior set of papers.51 He argued that Christians might pursue what he
Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds.
Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral, 228.
50
Ibid.
51
Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism, Part 1” and “Methodological Naturalism, Part 2.”
48
49

Faith and Philosophy

90

called “Augustinian” science as an alternative to the prevailing approach
to science committed to methodological naturalism. In his recent book
he has not pursued this course, but also has not simply disavowed it as
a non-starter.52 The strategy he adopts is similar in certain respects, but
retreats to a safer place by not attempting to claim the mantle of science.
He relies on the work he has done to defend the right of Christians to
claim knowledge with respect to Christian faith and that such knowledge
provides a wider evidence base than the truncated evidence set of methodologically naturalistic science. A Christian may discern that while the
claims of Simonian science might appear quite plausible given the narrower evidence set of science limited by a commitment to methodological
naturalism (MN), they may well not be plausible with respect to her wider
evidence set. In such cases, Simonian science does not provide a defeater
for Christian faith.
So, is it a good idea for Christians to pursue science under the guidelines of MN? Plantinga’s prior answer was: sometimes yes, sometimes no.
To get clearer on what this discussion might involve, let’s look at how he
understands MN. “According to MN, the data model of a proper scientific theory will not invoke God or other supernatural agents or employ
what one knows or thinks one knows by way of revelation.”53 A theory
as well cannot include reference to the supernatural in its actual postulations or appeal to what one knows or believes via revelation. Nor will such
science include in the evidence base beliefs entailed by the existence of supernatural beings and propositions about them or by revelation, e.g., the
doctrines of the Incarnation or Atonement. “Hence, rejecting, for example,
Herbert Simon’s theory of altruism because it is massively improbable with
respect to a Christian evidence base would presumably not be proper science—not at least, if proper science involves methodological naturalism.”54
Rather than question MN as a proper limit on science, Plantinga adopts a
more defensible, and in many ways quite reasonable strategy of arguing
that the evidence base available to a practicing scientist in her tool of arguments within science does not equal the Christian’s evidence base.55 This
change in strategy takes more seriously his philosophical defense of warranted Christian belief insofar as he sees no need to invoke science to gain
epistemic credibility.
In Where the Conflict Really Lies, Plantinga has taken a step in the right
direction to dampen the fears of conflict between science and faith. Unfortunately, the way he invokes Simonian science still suggests that we
Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 190.
Ibid., 172.
54
Ibid., 173.
55
The Christian may very well claim here that Simon’s account is highly limiting as an
understanding of altruism and other moral behaviors. After all, the Christian would want to
give credence to the influence of the Holy Spirit as a motivating force in a person’s decision
to help and care for others. We would agree. But as long as Simon’s account remains within
its limited scope there is no conflict with Christian belief.
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should be expecting conflict in a class of contemporary science, namely
evolutionary psychology, where such is arguably not the case. Finally,
he raises the question of whether Christians should simply respond to
claims of genuine conflict by judging the plausibility of such claims to be
low according to their wider evidence base. His answer to this is “no, not
necessarily” but the explanation is somewhat frustrating. He goes on at
some length to explain how such a negotiation might go in his discussion
of “Faith and Reason”56 and the “Reduction Test.”57 But at the end of the
day it amounts to this: beliefs of faith may be revised, but it would take
a lot of evidence to warrant revision and, if such beliefs are held as basic
(warranted straightaway), this counterevidence would need to be very
significant. Again it is helpful to remind us that good science (i.e., science
that has gathered sufficient evidence, has had a record of explanatory success, and has genuinely garnered the basis for claiming it has the truth
even about what goes beyond observation) can help us revise some of our
faith beliefs.
Another issue here that deserves attention is the extent to which
metatheoretical claims in general and Christian beliefs in particular come
into direct contact with scientific theorizing, at least if scientists remain
within the confines of MN in their work as scientists. We suggest it is
doubtful that Christian metatheory plays a role in scientific theorizing.
For example, Plantinga suggests Simonian science, even if successful science, would not be a defeater for:
(B) Mother Teresa was perfectly rational in behaving in that altruistic
manner.58

According to Plantinga, the reason Simonian science would not be a defeater for (B) is that Simonian science is unlikely to be true given the other
propositions in the Christian’s arsenal (evidence base) such as that “human
beings have been created by God and created in his image” etc.59 We argue
Simonian science is not a defeater for (B) because this claim is not, in fact,
in conflict with Simon’s theory. But Plantinga’s claim also flounders on the
vagueness of what it means to be created in God’s image. Without some
fairly well spelled out theory/theology of “image bearing,” it is not clear at
all that Simonian science, even on Plantinga’s understanding, is in conflict
with Christian beliefs regarding imago Dei, especially if one also takes the
fall seriously. Simonian science (operating within the constraints of MN)
is unlikely to be a defeater of any truly significant Christian belief because
those Christian beliefs are stated at such a level of abstraction that they never
clearly come into contact with the particular claims of Simonian science.
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That Christian control beliefs operate so weakly in the Simon case, a
case that several Christian thinkers see as in direct conflict with Christian
beliefs, may in part explain why there are no strong research programs
coming out of the Christian tradition, as Wolterstorff calls for in Reason
within the Bounds of Religion. It may simply be the case that Christian
metatheoretical assumptions are too abstract and indeterminate to operate
strongly at the level of theory construction and evaluation. The claim here
is not that metatheories have nothing to say about theory construction and
evaluation. But perhaps that relationship is not as direct and restrictive as
seems to be suggested by Plantinga and others.
Plantinga is on the right track to argue that the evolutionary claims of
Simon and David Sloan Wilson are, at most, in superficial conflict with
Christian faith. And he is right to argue that the partisans of such areas
of science, such as evolutionary explanations of religion, can sometimes
fall prey to the temptation of overreaching interpretation. However, given
the long history of conflict, it seems wise to restrict the “conflict” call to
very clear cases. In this instance, Plantinga’s claim about evolutionary psychology fails to meet that standard.60
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